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PROPERTY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
E. LEES*
ABSTRACT
Intergenerational justice, community interests, and environmental
protection are all goals sought through the imposition of the duties of stewardship onto owners of land. But such duties, when imposed by law,
require justification beyond the morality of maintaining and preserving
land in a good condition for its present and future use. The potential for
sanction imposed by the state means that stewardship duties, if they are
to be justified, must be grounded in established principles of justified
legal intervention. Of those, the most convincing is, and always has been,
the harm principle: intervention is justified where a rule prevents one
person from harming another. This test is a challenge for duties of stewardship, where the focus is on preserving one’s own land for the benefit
of future generations; who is harmed by a failure to comply? This Article
explains that the harm in such a breach of duty lies in the erosion of the
collective interest which cements the community of land owners and users,
a collective to which the relevant owner of land herself belongs. The community is justified in imposing sanction for breach of that rule, not because
of any environmental damage per se, but in order to ensure the continued
and ongoing existence of the group. In this way, stewardship should be
seen not as a rule arising from environmental ethics, but as a coordination rule, justified by the role it plays in maintaining the collective, and
as such, stewardship thus inheres in private property. The two are not
dichotomous, but inextricable.
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Man did not weave the web of life: he is merely a strand in
it.
Whatever he does to the web, he does to himself.1
1

Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198, 198 (1990) (citing Letter from Chief Seattle, patriarch of the
Duwamish and Squamish Indians of Puget Sound, to U.S. President Franklin Pierce
(1855) (presenting a powerful case for obligations resting on the present generation for
the collective of future generations, and for an ensuing planetary trust)). Its reproduction
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INTRODUCTION
As we enter the era of the anthropocene,2 a call to arms reverberates around the environmental law academy for the imposition of stewardship duties onto the owners of land.3 Such owners would become obliged
to maintain their land for the benefit of future generations,4 for the natural
world as a whole,5 and for their own well-being.6 Such a call assumes, however, that the imposition of this obligation is justified, relying as it does
on the “universally accepted” goal of environmental protection.7 This
here is testament to both its sentiment, and to the arguments of Brown Weiss which follow
this quotation.
2
The term “anthropocene” was used first by Eugene F. Stoermer and has since been
popularized by Paul J. Crutzen and others. It is used to signify the geological era defined
by man’s influence on the Earth’s geology. See Paul J. Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoermer, The
“Anthropocene,” 41 GLOB. CHANGE NEWSL. 17 (2000); Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene:
Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature? 36 AMBIO 8 (2007).
3
E.g., Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity,
11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 496 (1984); David Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property:
A Call for Judicial Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources,
12 HARV. ENTL. L. REV. 311, 319 (1998); Lynton K. Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights
of Use?—The Need for a New Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV.
759, 766 (1974); James P. Karp, A Private Property Duty of Stewardship: Changing our Land
Ethic, 23 ENVTL. L. 735, 735 (1993); William Lucy & Catherine Mitchell, Replacing Private
Property: The Case for Stewardship, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 566, 566 (1996); Charles Reich, The
Liberty Impact of the New Property, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295, 304–05 (1990); Charles
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964); Christopher Rodgers, Nature’s Place?
Property Rights, Property Rules, and Environmental Stewardship, 68 CAMBRIDGE L. J.
550, 553 (2009); Jennifer Welchman, A Defence of Environmental Stewardship, 21 ENVTL.
VALUES 297, 298 (2012); Victor Yannacone, Private Property Plus Public Interest Equals
Social Property, 23 S.D. L. REV. 71, 71 (1978).
4
See discussion infra Section I.C.1.
5
See discussion infra Section I.C.2.
6
The argument that complying with the duties of stewardship is good for one’s own health
is not considered in detail here, for the essence of stewardship is managing resources for
the benefit of others. In that sense, management for one’s own health is not an optimal
expression of stewardship duties. Having said that, it is of course trite to note that maintaining one’s land in an environmentally sound state is likely to be beneficial to one’s own
health, even if it is not necessarily beneficial to one’s coffers. Furthermore, in the more
attenuated sense explained in Section II.C, it is very much in one’s own interest to comply
with the duties of stewardship. However, as Edith Brown Weiss explains, each person
has an intimate connection with the planet and its ecosystem. Brown Weiss, supra note
1, at 198–99. Caldwell, too, notes that the stewardship ethic views “man as belonging to the
totality of nature,” and this applies as much to the landowner as it does to her neighbors
and the wider community. Caldwell, supra note 3, at 767.
7
E.g., Christopher B. Barrett & Raymond E. Grizzle, A Holistic Approach to Sustainability Based on Pluralism Stewardship, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 23, 23, 35–36 (1999) (in which

544

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 43:541

Article generates justification for the imposition by law of the precise
duties of stewardship through an understanding of the nature of group
obligations. In brief, stewardship is justified when conceptualized as a
coordination rule.
Stewardship of land is commonly understood to be an ethical and
legal principle (in the sense that it promotes, but does not demand, a
particular course of action), invoked to justify the imposition of specific
duties onto one with control over a particular resource, so that they utilize
and exploit that resource only in such a way as to protect the integrity of
the resource.8 The word “stewardship,” however, is occasionally used imprecisely as justification for limiting the ability of the right-holder to damage, destroy, or diminish the resource.9 It is an environmentalist’s panacea,
a concept which in a single breath has the power to capture how we
should be caring for our planetary resources and which would sit at the
heart of our private property system, so maligned for its ongoing effects
on the natural world.
But this is not enough. We must explain why such an obligation
would be justified as being imposed by law. As an ethical principle, its
justifications are relatively clear, if multitudinous (and, by that token,
open to their own challenges).10 This does not tell us why legal property
rights should be limited. Stewardship is an answer: it is not a justification for limitation of rights; it is the limitation of rights. Much scholarship fails to appreciate this.11 In this way, the scholarship becomes mere
the authors make reference in their opening remarks to the consensus emerging amongst
environmentalists about the need to protect nature and to limit property rights to achieve
that protection).
8
The nature of legal principles is of course a contested issue within the environmental
law literature, and more generally. The definitional approach adopted here is in line with
that of Dworkin, who explains that principles, unlike rules, “state[ ] a reason that argues
in one direction but does not necessitate a particular decision.” RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 26 (1977). In an environmental context, this approach to principles
seems especially apt, as explained by Fisher. ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK: REGULATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 41 (2d ed. 2010).
9
E.g., Caldwell, supra note 3, at 769–70 (explaining what would be required of a rational
land use policy, including ensuring that individuals take account of wider society when
making decisions in relation to their ownership of land, so that such duties are imposed
because the landowner is a steward). Stewardship on these approaches is justified because
it achieves an end, but the step from morality to law is not explained.
10
See infra Section I.C (considering the justifications for the ethical principle of stewardship).
11
See Caldwell, supra note 3, at 767 (Caldwell emphasizes that the source of this ethical
duty is at once semi-religious, mythical, and scientific, as we explore below. See discussion
infra Section I.C).
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rhetoric. Stewardship is not a justification, so to take its place among the
pantheon of legal norms, it requires justification.
However, it is possible to justify stewardship. There are many
theoretical bases upon which such a justification can be built. Some call,
altruistically, upon a resource-holder to self-limit his actions for the benefit
of others.12 This would be admirable, but it would make stewardship and
the imposition of stewardship duties in a private property focused legal
system a hard sell. Indeed, such an approach is almost impossible to align
with the concerns expressed in the “harm principle” and as such will
neither be universally accepted, nor enough to justify the imposition of
coercive punishments in cases of breach. This Article demonstrates justification for stewardship not as a rule which allows for protection of the
environment, but as a coordination rule. Stewardship is to property ownership, as driving on the right (or, in this author’s jurisdiction, on the
left) is to safe highways. The justification for stewardship duties arises
therefore through membership of the community of landowners and
users and in the mutually supporting duties which are required to keep
a network of rights operating smoothly. Thus, stewardship duties are
inherently justified by the fact of property rights in land. As we proceed
into the anthropocene, understanding such justification may well be necessary in the face of impending environmental disaster.
I.

STEWARDSHIP AS AN ETHICAL PRINCIPLE

As noted, stewardship is an ethical concept13 and a legal principle.
The relationship between the two is complex. However, the history of
stewardship gives us some clues as to its justifications. The starting
point is the ethical concept because it allows a deeper understanding of
the meaning of stewardship. Indeed, as an ethical principle, stewardship
has a long and varied history, appearing in different value systems and
ethics to perform a variety of tasks, and it is therefore difficult to generalize about its meaning.14 Despite the difficulty of defining stewardship,
it is nevertheless possible to outline a relatively uncontroversial, if broad,
12

See Jennifer Welchman, The Virtues of Stewardship, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 411, 415 (1999).
See Caldwell, supra note 3, at 767 (Caldwell emphasizes that the source of this ethical
duty is at once semi-religious, mythical, and scientific, as we explore below. Infra discussion at Section I.C).
14
Welchman, supra note 3, at 199–200; ROBERT ATTFIELD, THE ETHICS OF THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT 45 (1999).
13
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definition of stewardship in land,15 and we will look here at environmental stewardship in particular to give richness to the texture of the principle as it emerges in the literature. We then briefly outline the different
justifications for the stewardship ethic in order to explore more fully how
we ought to understand stewardship and to shed some light on why it is
so challenging to bridge the gap between the morally right and the legally justified.
A.

Stewardship Generally

As with almost all areas of ethical debate, uncontroversial and
conclusive definitions here prove elusive. The main problem lies in giving
enough content to the principle to make it a meaningful guide to conduct,
whilst remaining sufficiently general that the full range of stewardship
is captured. The definition given by Welchman demonstrates this problem. She explains that, “[t]o be a steward is to devote a substantial
percentage of one’s thoughts and efforts to maintaining or enhancing the
condition of some thing(s) or person(s), not primarily for the steward’s
own sake.”16
This definition attempts to state the general thrust of stewardship, but fails to highlight what is distinctive about stewardship as an
ethical principle and indeed is (understandably) tentative in its conclusion. Crucially, however, this definition fails to emphasize the importance
of accountability. It is not enough that the steward acts with something
in mind other than her own interests. She will also be answerable for her
actions in “maintaining or enhancing” the thing.17
At the heart of the stewardship ethic is a notion of enforceable
responsibility and of sanction, be that, in secular versions of the principle, accountability to the people or state, or in non-secular versions, to
God. It is only by acknowledging that the true steward must justify
himself to others that the operation of stewardship can be understood. In
the non-secular stewardship model, man, as a whole, and each person
individually, is responsible to God for their actions as steward.18 Attfield
explains that, “[w]hatever our laws may say about property . . . humans
do not own the Earth . . . but hold or possess [it] on a provisional basis
hence their answerability.”19
15

Different arguments may apply where the object of the stewardship duty is not land.
Welchman, supra note 12, at 415.
17
Id.
18
ATTFIELD, supra note 14.
19
Id.
16
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It is this answerability in Attfield’s account that is the essence of
stewardship, and, as we shall see below, the provisionality of man’s
presence on Earth also goes some way to explaining the justification for
legal duties.
In secular versions too the steward is accountable and will be
responsible to the state, the people generally, or to a specific person for
his actions.20 Stewardship entails answerability precisely because the
owner of property is not able to use this property in any way he desires.
The key to a trust is the enforceability of the trust obligation, the duty
to account.21 The same can be said for stewardship.22 For this reason,
Welchman’s definition will be adapted to include this element of sanction
for the moral failure to comply with the obligations of stewardship.
Therefore, the general definition as derived from the ethic of stewardship
is: a steward must manage or enhance something for someone or something else and will be answerable for any failure to do so. As will become
apparent, this definition links closely with how stewardship has developed
as a legal principle.
B.

Environmental Stewardship

We come now to environmental stewardship, but one of a multitude of branches of the wider ethic: Agricultural stewardship, stewardship of historical and cultural artifacts, and stewardship of companies all
fall within this wider concern to manage a resource for the benefit of
something or someone other than the current users.23 Although each of
these focuses on the key idea of an obligation to manage for the benefit
of others, the content of the obligation will vary from context to context.
In this sense, stewardship in general, and its specific manifestations, are
contingent, hence their status as principles rather than rules. In addition, the “others” for whom one must manage the property will also vary
depending on the strand of stewardship being examined.
A useful definition with which to commence our discussion is that
formerly adopted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”):
20

Id.
This analogy between the trust and stewardship will be discussed in more detail below.
See discussion infra Section II.A.2. For the role of accountability in the ethical principles
of stewardship, see Barrett & Grizzle, supra note 7, at 30; supra Section I.A.
22
See id.
23
E.g., GUIDO VAN HUYLENBROECK & MARTIN WHITBY, COUNTRYSIDE STEWARDSHIP: FARMERS, POLICIES AND MARKETS 1–2 (1999); John L. Paterson, Conceptualizing Stewardship
in Agriculture within the Christian Tradition, 25 ENVTL. ETHICS 43, 44 (2003).
21
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We define environmental stewardship as the responsibility for environmental quality shared by all those whose
actions affect the environment . . . . It is also a behavior, one
demonstrated through continuous improvement of environmental performance, and a commitment to efficient use of
natural resources, protection of ecosystems, and, where applicable, ensuring a baseline of compliance with environmental requirements.24
This definition is useful because it is relatively specific and highlights a
number of important features of environmental stewardship. This definition, although detailed, fails to mention the aspect of answerability outlined
above, missing one of the crucial aspects of stewardship.
Critically, it does, however, emphasize an important issue regarding
environmental stewardship. The term “stewardship” refers to responsibilities and the behavior of the steward when meeting his responsibilities.
The norm and the descriptor of a behavior are not coterminous, and just
because someone is behaving as a steward, it does not mean that they
ought to do so. The ethic of stewardship is a guide—it tells us how we
should behave. When examining discussions of stewardship, it is important always to distinguish between the norm, “one should behave according to the principle of stewardship” and the description, “he is behaving
as a steward.” This distinction is crucial when asking the question, “who
is the steward” since this could mean either, “who should act according
to the principles of stewardship” or “who is acting according to these
principles.” This Article explores the first sense and in this way is explicitly a normative, rather than a descriptive, project. Our definition of environmental stewardship then is a definition of what the ethical principle
of stewardship demands in relation to the environment. Stewardship
entails an obligation to manage or enhance the use of natural resources (for
the purposes of this Article, land) to ensure a high level of environmental
performance, demonstrating a commitment to efficient use of natural
resources and to protection of ecosystems for the benefit of someone or
something else, and ensures accountability for any failure to do so.
This definition requires further elaboration. We know that stewardship requires management of property for the benefit of “others,” but
we must ask, first, what is meant by the management of property to ensure
a high level of environmental performance, and second, who the “others”
24

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVERYDAY CHOICES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
STEWARDSHIP (2005) at 2.

2019]

PROPERTY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

549

are. In relation to the first, Lucy and Mitchell describe “[t]he hallmark
of stewardship [as] land holding subject to responsibilities of careful use,
rather than extensive rights to exclude, control and alienate that are
characteristic of private property.”25 They therefore focus on the notion
of careful use, which, when adapted to cover environmental concerns specifically, indicates that responsible environmental performance is achieved
not by reference to some absolute standard, but rather by reference to
what is reasonable or expected from the steward in terms of their attitude.
This approach, whilst sensitive to the contingent nature of principles
explained above,26 is also circular. We have also excluded from our definition here the reference in the EPA definition to compliance with existing
legal standards,27 for stewardship may go further and not as far as such
standards. Instead, existing legal standards may, when the ethic of stewardship is translated into law, help to give content to the general norm
but be insufficient in themselves, or they may be the very definition of it.
Thus, neither a purely subjective “attitude-focused,” nor reference to existing norms, can be enough to populate the concept of ensuring a high
level of environmental performance. Rather, we must accept that the
content of this obligation, both ethically, and as we shall see, legally, will
flex according to the surrounding facts, but must contain with it references to both the attitude, and to the objective outcome, of decisions made.
In terms of the “others” for whom stewardship will demand one
acts, Caldwell explains that “ownership or possession of land is viewed
as a trust, with attendant obligations to future generations as well as to
the present.”28 This is reflective of many accounts of the ethic of stewardship, so that the obligation is therefore not only to use the land carefully,
but to manage the land with a view to benefitting future generations, even
where this conflicts with the steward’s present needs. Lucy and Mitchell,
in not relying on the interests of future generations in their definition,
may well avoid some of the difficulties of determining which of a theoretically infinite number of future generations should be taken into account,
and of working out what actions would or would not be in their interest.29
Missing this future element, however, fails to demonstrate what is distinctive about stewardship. It is the mixture of right and obligation with
a view to both the present and the future that is central to the notion of
environmental stewardship, however challenging it may be in practice
25

Lucy & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 584.
See supra text at note 8.
27
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 24, at 2.
28
Caldwell, supra note 3, at 766.
29
See Lucy & Mitchell, supra note 3. Cf. Brown Weiss, supra note 1, at 199–200.
26
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to know what behaviors such a norm entails. Stewardship is about more
than ensuring that the earth’s resources are not depleted—it is also about
ensuring that land is in a certain state and as such can be used to tackle
pollution and contamination, as well as overuse. In order to understand this
general definition more fully, it is necessary to examine the justifications
said to be behind this ethical principle. Why is there an obligation to manage property for the benefit of future generations?
C.

Justifications for the Ethical Principle of Stewardship

There are many potential justifications for the ethic of stewardship, and these justifications can lead to conflicting formulations of the
content of the obligation. This Article will discuss some of these different
justifications, not to determine which is the most coherent or satisfactory
in terms of explaining stewardship, but in order to try to highlight some
common features which then form the starting point for exploring the
justifications for any ensuing legal obligations. The justifications examined here will be, first, secular justifications based on ideas of justice and
ecology, and, secondly, religious justifications.
1.

Intergenerational Justice

First, many see stewardship as based on the moral duties associated with intergenerational equity (hence the future focus). Brown Weiss
takes this approach, arguing that, “[a]s members of the present generation, we hold the earth in trust for future generations. At the same time,
we are beneficiaries entitled to use and benefit from it.”30 Attfield, too,
relies on an intergenerational justification for stewardship but gives
more details as to the content of the resulting obligations.
Current agents, to the extent that they have the necessary
powers and resources, have obligations to provide for the
satisfaction of the basic needs of future generations, and
to facilitate the development in the future of characteristic
human capacities . . . that such satisfactions and development can foreseeably be facilitated.31

30
31

Brown Weiss, supra note 1, at 199.
ATTFIELD, supra note 14, at 157.
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He argues that the ethical justification for the principle “supplies
a substantive content to trusteeship.”32 The obligation that he thus associates with intergenerational justice is an obligation not only to allow the
basic needs of future generations to flourish, e.g., through permitting food
production and maintaining water supplies, but also to develop distinctively human characteristics. Arguably this implies that the stewardship
duty could include maintaining the aesthetic value of areas of natural
beauty to promote artistic and literary endeavors, or the protection of
buildings of special historical value to promote learning. In this sense, we
can see in these definitions a close relationship between the requirements of intergenerational justice and the idea of human flourishing.
Brown Weiss too advocates this approach as it allows a wealth
and depth of cultural and ecological heritage.33 She outlines three principles of intergenerational justice which support the principles of stewardship. First, each generation will fall under an obligation to preserve the
“diversity of the natural and cultural resource base”;34 second, each generation must keep the planet in a good state such that it is passed on in
“no worse a condition than that in which it was received . . .”;35 and third,
each generation must ensure that future generations have access to the
“legacy of past generations.”36 The scope of this definition of intergenerational justice, and of the stewardship obligation that it engenders, are
wider than environmental protection, and extend into a justification for
preservation of the total range of sensory and intellectual sources that
each generation has the privilege to enjoy. It includes within it a crucial
focus on the state of the planet and its resources. In short, each generation must manage its resources in such a way that will not harm or
prevent the flourishing of future generations. We can justify this intergenerational focus by reference to Rawlsian conceptions of justice. According to Rawls:
The correct principle is that which the members of any
generation (and so all generations) would adopt as the one
their generation is to follow and as the principle they would
want preceding generations to have followed (and later

32

Id. at 162.
Brown Weiss, supra note 1, at 202.
34
Id. at 201–02.
35
Id. at 202.
36
Id.
33
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generations to follow), no matter how far back (or forward)
in time . . . .37
Stewardship which concerns itself with management of natural resources
fits into this pattern of acting from the “position of ignorance.”
There are difficulties with the approach which looks to the balance of rights and obligations between generations, and whilst it is not
possible to examine the nature of this controversy in detail here, it is
necessary to outline the difficulties with an “intergenerational justice”
explanation of stewardship. There is considerable controversy, despite
the fact that the justification for stewardship is the promotion of the
interests of future human beings, as to whether future generations are
in fact capable of holding “rights” (either moral or legal) which are
enforced through these obligations.38 This difficulty is significant for the
question of the nature of the obligation that rests on the steward. To put
this another way, using concepts of intergenerational justice to explain
the necessity of accountability to a true definition of stewardship is not
straightforward.
Certainly it is problematic to ground any such obligations in rights
or interests held in “the present” by future generations, since such generations (obviously) do not yet exist, nor can we know who or how many will
make up the sum of these future generations. This argument is often presented as a stumbling block to our having obligations owed to future generations.39 Thus, per White, “[i]t is . . . a fallacy to argue, as is commonly
done, that because a certain class of thing, whether . . . the environment
[or] . . . generations yet to come, . . . is capable of having, or actually has
something in its interest, therefore it is capable of having a right.”40
Interests, he highlights, are not enough to ground rights and, as
a corollary, may not be enough to ground obligations.
There are answers to this problem. First, it is possible to conclude,
as White does, that interests are neither sufficient nor necessary to the
founding of rights and that temporality is not critical to the existence of
37

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 274 (Expanded ed. 2005).
Lukas Meyer, Intergenerational Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-intergenerational/ [https://perma.cc/BF6V-P35L].
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rights; persons, he argues, whether born or not, are capable of having
rights simply by virtue of their being persons.41 Similarly, Warren, when
discussing the rights of persons who will never be born, discusses the
position in relation to future generations and concludes that:
To say that merely potential people are not the sort of
things which can possibly have moral rights is by no means
to imply that we can have no obligations toward people of
future generations, or that they (will) have no rights that
can be violated by things which we do now.42
As fellow human beings, we should treat them as we would want to be
treated. This approach disentangles the obligation from rights, and departs
from the widely accepted understanding that obligations entail rights
and vice versa.
The second potential solution to this difficulty is suggested by
Hoerster. He argues that:
[W]e can safely assume, first, that future people will be
bearers of rights in the future, second, that the rights they
have will be determined by the interests they have then,
and third, that our present actions and policies can affect
their interests. If we can violate a person’s rights by frustrating her interests severely, and if we can so severely
frustrate such interests of future people, we can violate
their future rights.43
As a result it is theoretically possible to ground an obligation in the notion
of intergenerational justice. If either of these explanations can ground
rights in future generations, then we can conclude that this could give
rise to a corresponding obligation on us.44 It is perhaps no surprise, however, that this theory is not universally accepted.
2.

Ecocentric and Ecological Justifications

Any understanding of stewardship which relies on intergenerational justice does seem to ignore the potential ecological, rather than
41
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anthropological, benefits of stewardship. This is a popular comment on
the stewardship approach that relies on Rawls. Barry, for example, sees
long-sighted anthropocentrism as a key aspect of ecological stewardship.45
Goldstein, too, focuses on the anthropocentric moral justification for the
principle: “[s]tewardship is about benefitting society, but it includes
future generations within that zone of protection.”46 These views exclude
the protection of natural interests for their own sake.
This focus on the needs and wants of man has often been used as
a criticism of stewardship.47 Goldstein argues that stewardship “gives us
a legally cognizable obligation, based on ecology and interpreted using
the principles of environmental ethics.”48 The ethics of ecology stipulate
that the natural world should be seen as a single system within which
one interference can have wide and unexpected consequences.49 For this
reason, many of those of a “deep green” or ecocentric perspective advance
the principle of stewardship, not as a matter of intergenerational equity,
but as a means of promoting ecological soundness.50 As Caldwell makes
clear, however, stewardship can only promote ecological principles where
it is accompanied with a change in social behavior and understandings
of man’s relationship with nature.51 It is this aspect of stewardship that
draws many tribal cultures to it, e.g., American Indian and Aboriginal
culture. Buddhism also places value on ecological awareness and stewardship for ecocentric, as opposed to anthropocentric, reasons.52
Difficult as it is to ground rights in future generations on the basis
of intergenerational equity, however, it is even more problematic to found
an obligation on an individual person to behave according to the principles of stewardship on the basis of “rights” of an ecosystem or a species.
This Article is not the place to discuss the ability of animals and plants
to hold rights,53 but even if such rights are logically possible, the adoption
45
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of a wholly ecocentric approach to stewardship must result in serious
consequences for the type of ensuing obligation.
It is suggested here that it is not necessary to adopt a wholly
anthropocentric view in order to allow the relevant rights to be vested in
future generations. In the same way that parents have rights for the
benefit of their children, and trustees have rights for the benefit of the
beneficiary, it is suggested that future generations can be the holders of
rights that the current generation act according to the principles of
stewardship, both for their own benefit, and for the benefit of the natural
world. This allows us to take a middle course between a wholly anthropocentric and a wholly ecocentric approach. It allows a recognition that
both man and nature can be benefitted if stewardship is adopted given
its anthropocentric and ecocentric secular justifications. Brown Weiss
argues that these two ideas can be joined together under a broad understanding of intergenerational justice, stating:
[t]here are two relationships that must shape any theory
of intergenerational equity in the context of our natural
environment: our relationship to other generations of our
own species and our relationship to the natural system of
which we are a part.54
3.

Judeo-Christian Stewardship

There is also widespread non-secular justification for stewardship.
It has very strong ties with both Judeo-Christian55 and Islamic culture.56
Christian and Jewish philosophies draw on, amongst other texts,57 Genesis:
“[t]he Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to work it
and keep it.”58 This viewpoint sees man as unique in being able to protect
other parts of the ecosystem. With this ability comes responsibility to
supra note 52. Christopher Stone’s article is also informative in this regard. See generally
Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 1972 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
54
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ensure that man does not exploit the Earth, but instead maintains it and
keeps it on behalf of God. As with the secular justification of intergenerational justice, many have argued that this attitude, of man as dominant
over nature, tends to sacrifice nature to man’s will rather than imposing
a duty to protect it.59 Brennon and Lo argue, however, that “[t]he JudeoChristian tradition of thought about nature, despite being predominantly
despotic, contained resources for regarding humans as stewards or perfectors of God’s creation.”60 The United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops61 agrees with this, describing man’s stewardship of land as being
about thoughtful, rather than selfish, management.62
Not only is there a strong philosophical justification for stewardship founded in these religions, there is also a strong link between the
Judeo-Christian concept of stewardship and the legal principle. It is perhaps unsurprising that the links between them are so close since the two
grew up side by side in early legal systems. This can be seen in Leviticus
25:23: “The land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is mine. For
you are strangers and sojourners with me. And in all the country you
possess, you shall allow a redemption of the land.”63
The reference here to tenancy demonstrates the links between the
ethical and legal principle. At the time of the Old Testament, a steward was
generally a manager for another, usually a royal personage.64 It seems
then that not only is there a Judeo-Christian justification for the principles of stewardship, but these religions have also helped to shape the
content of the legal forms of the principle.
4.

Islamic Stewardship

Islamic philosophy on stewardship also sees the world as belonging to God with man accountable for its upkeep.65 An example of this is
59
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the Islamic law rule of “himas” which involves the protection of specified
areas of land from overuse.66 This rule is used today in Islamic cultures
to advocate a stewardship approach to environmental protection:67 the
overall goal of the hima revival is to mesh traditional practices with recent
conservation science as a way to reach sustainable development.68 This
attitude is a reflection of the teachings of the Qur’an, which states: “I am
setting on the earth a vice-regent.”69 This is not to say of course, either
in relation to Islam, or the Jewish and Christian faiths, that there is a
prevailing opinion that man is steward of the earth amongst followers of
the faiths. Rather the purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate that
the principle does at least find support in these religious texts such that
it is possible to draw on the relationship between man and the deity in
order to justify stewardship.
5.

The Success of and Interaction Between These Justifications

There is therefore a series of strong justifications for stewardship.
As was highlighted above, there are flaws in these justifications and each
may not be capable of justifying stewardship but there is not space here
to defend each of the justifications against possible criticisms. Instead,
it is hoped that the discussion here has shown enough at least to suggest
that the stewardship moral obligation is potentially justifiable. This Article
is not the place to attempt to outline a definitive justification for stewardship. It has been argued at least, however, that the anthropocentric and
ecocentric views can to an extent be reconciled.70 Barrett and Grizzle
describe the pitting of ecocentrism against anthropocentrism as unnecessary.71 It is not possible to draw all these justificatory threads together
in limited space, but what can be said clearly is that the justification for
66
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stewardship broadly relies on the fact that man ought to manage natural
resources, be this for his own benefit, for the benefit of nature, or in order
to fulfill his obligations to God. As a result, environmental stewardship
must at least aim to protect and manage the state of land and must do
so for the benefit of the future.
Neither an ecocentric nor an anthropocentric justification for stewardship can, however, account for the legal obligations that arise to ensure
stewardship, and reconciling them in the way suggested here does not
solve this problem. Thus, an anthropocentric approach does not demand
that a landowner manage his land in order to ensure a range of ecological
habitats where the species that subsequently flourish do not give rise to
any identifiable benefit to man. Conversely, stewardship obligations do
not necessarily demand that the interests of nature are treated equally
with the interests of man such that the obligation can be justified by
deep green principles. This is not to say that stewardship obligations
cannot be justified, but that “stewardship” as a concept is sufficiently
broad to cover the obligation that results when one of these perspectives
is adopted. Ecological justifications cannot explain the full range of
potential stewardship obligations, and nor can anthropological justifications. But this does not mean that a stewardship obligation cannot be
justified, and that its content cannot be linked to its justification. As a
result, it is necessary to choose, to some extent, which aspect of stewardship to prioritize. The explanation of the various justifications for stewardship simply helps us to understand the content and shape of the
relevant obligations and why they might arise.
For the purposes of this Article, then, it will be assumed that at
least part of the interests of the future that will be protected are the
interests of future man. This approach is also adopted by Barrett and
Grizzle who specify that, “we subscribe to the weak anthropocentric view
that although humans are not exclusively valuable, as implied by strong
anthropocentrism, neither are they of equal value with all other species,
as suggested by biocentrists.”72
D.

Breach of the Moral Obligation to Act According to the
Principles of Stewardship

Thus although there is perhaps not one single justification that
explains the stewardship obligation, it has been demonstrated that if
72
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stewardship is indeed justifiable, the obligation that arises is one which
is of value in and of itself, rather than simply being a means to an end.
It remains to be seen, however, what, if any, sanction applies if there is
a breach of this moral obligation since this would help explain the accountability aspect of stewardship which, as will be seen below, is so
central to the legal principle of stewardship. What happens when you are
a bad steward? There is no conclusive answer to this question, given the
plurality of the justificatory “sources.”
However, there are at least two types of sanction that may be imposed on a “bad steward.” First, there is the sanction of condemnation—be
that, according to a religious understanding of stewardship, a sanction imposed by God, or in a secular understanding, condemnation by the community of which an individual is part.73 Secondly, there is a more complex
type of sanction that arises as a result of failure to confer a benefit on
oneself. The steward will be a member of a generation benefitted by the
imposition of stewardship obligations onto those in a position to make
decisions about the state of land. By failing to comply with the stewardship obligations that fall on him, he acts on his land in such a way that is
detrimental to himself as a member of the wider land community.74 These
potential sanctions will be explained in turn although it should be understood that failure to comply with stewardship obligations could lead to
both sanctions arising.
First, there is the sanction of condemnation by others. This sanction is often used to explain the motivation behind compliance with a
rule.75 Hart, for example, makes clear that rule breaking justifies “hostile
reactions”76 and as such can be seen as a reason why people follow moral
(and indeed legal) rules. As Green highlights, “the normal function of
sanctions . . . is to reinforce duties.”77 It is clear, however, that this sort
of sanction is not necessary in order for the rule itself to be valid.78 Thus
the rule can exist even if there is no moral condemnation for its specific
breach. There may be many reasons why there is no sanction for any
73
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particular breach—impossibility of discovery of the breach; any explanation for the breach lessening the moral condemnation attached to the
breach; or indeed simply ambivalence or forgiveness in those who would
normally supply the condemnation. Whilst none of these factors mean that
there would never be a sanction for breach, they do mean that sometimes
there would be no sanction and yet there is no doubt that the rule would
still exist.
There are two ways out of this difficulty. The first is to suggest
that what matters for stewardship is not that there would be a sanction
if the obligation was breached, but that there could be. There must be at
least the potential for accountability. The second explanation is that the
moral stewardship obligation would only exist as long as there was no
systematic ambivalence towards the breach. If there was a common
attitude that breach of the obligation would not justify condemning the
person who committed that breach, the rule would, in effect, no longer be
a rule of the particular system or group.79 As a result, it seems, there
must be at least the potential of social condemnation in order for us to
conclude that there is a moral obligation to comply with the requirements of stewardship.
The other possible source of such a sanction arises as a result of
the fact that, in addition to being subject to the responsibilities of stewardship, a steward is a member of a generation in theory benefitted by
the duties of stewardship.80 By failing to comply with his own stewardship obligations, he risks his being a beneficiary of the obligation in others.
In brief, he makes it less likely that others will also comply with their
stewardship obligations. This will impose a sanction on him because he
will not thereby be benefitted by others complying with their obligations.
Here, by breaching the stewardship obligation, the steward no longer
ensures that his and other land is in a good state for his own future use.
He does this because there is a risk that the rule is no longer effective as
Honoré outlines.81 He thus loses a benefit himself in prioritizing his shortterm ambitions, or laziness, etc., over his long-term needs as a human
being. As a result, we can see that even if there is no mechanism or
means of social condemnation in a particular case for breach of the moral
stewardship obligation, there is another sanction in the form of a potential failure to benefit.
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STEWARDSHIP AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE

Having discussed the ethical background to the principle, this Article will now examine the nature of stewardship as a legal principle, and
in doing so, will outline the hallmarks of stewardship as manifested in law.
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

82

The aim of the regime must, at least in part, be to
preserve the quality and state of land for the future.
The regime must attempt to meet this aim by placing obligations on the person entitled by virtue of
their rights in land to make decisions in relation to
that land for careful and responsible use and management. This requirement focuses on two separate issues: the first is that the regime must in fact
place an obligation on the decision-maker in relation to the land by burdening his decision-making
power. The second issue is that this obligation
must be to make careful and responsible use and
management of the land in line with the environmental guidelines explained above.82
In considering what constitutes such careful and responsible use and management the landowner must,
in part, take account of the needs of future generations and/or the ecosystem with a view to maintaining its quality for the future. It is not necessary that
future interests are the only factors considered, but
it is necessary that they at least play a part.
This obligation to make careful and responsible use
and management of the land taking into account
the needs of future generations must burden the
decision-maker’s power of decision-making in the
land. This hallmark calls for the obligation itself to
attach to all the landowner’s rights of ownership,
not simply one incident of the rights of ownership,
e.g., the right to alienate the land, and goes beyond
their rights in relation to use.
Not only must the regime call on the owner to do
all these things, but he must do them in a certain
way. His decision-making process must be altered

See supra Section I.B.
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by the regime such that stewardship itself is encouraged rather than merely the outcome of the
preservation of land.
The owner must be answerable for failures to meet
his obligations.

Forms of Stewardship as a Legal Principle

As with the ethical principle, the precise meaning of the legal principle varies hugely according to context and there is little consensus as
to the content of the obligations,83 even within one context. There are two
key historical forms of stewardship: the steward as akin to a warden, and
the steward as akin to a trustee.84 The examples here are used to show
the different purposes to which stewardship duties can be put, and the
range of meanings possible within the wider framework. However, it
should be noted that whilst all represent facets of the “stewardship personality,” none is its definitive expression. In this way, the justification
which we build for stewardship duties in these forms contains within it
enough flexibility to allow for the kinds of variation that we see in practice, which are called for by the ethical principle as discussed above, and
which are realistic when considering the flexible role which legal principles
can play. Indeed, if we are to take a reasonably pragmatic and pluralistic85 approach to stewardship, it would be counter-productive to conceive
of its forms in too limited a scope, given that the hurdle of justification
must still be overcome in all cases.
1.

Steward as a Warden

The first (false) form of stewardship which has been seen in legal
history is the steward as “warden” of a house, i.e., the literal translation
of the word steward from waerd (warden) and stig (house).86 This extends
into the figure of the steward as the agent or land manager for the
existing owner of the land.87 He was the “arch-administrator of the lay
estate.”88 Swett succinctly outlines the steward’s role as warden: “[t]he
steward was his lord’s agent, paid to serve his interests, please him, and
83
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protect his property.”89 This principle looks at stewards as acting for the
benefit of another, but for the present only, not for the future (unlike the
ethical principle outlined above). Furthermore, this form of stewardship,
as Denman makes clear, was a question of administration rather than
morality and is not the focus of this Article.90 The steward here acts as
an agent for the principal landowner.91 He is not bound by obligations of
stewardship as explained in the hallmarks outlined here, but must act
for the benefit of the principal by virtue of his acting as agent. This historical form of stewardship is now more appropriately understood as being
a form of agency, and will not be discussed further here. It is useful to
consider briefly however to rule out similar kinds of trust or agencybased roles which do not sufficiently satisfy the hallmarks of stewardship
to meet its modern conceptualization.
2.

Steward as Trustee

The second strand is the steward as the trustee for the unidentified or future owner of land. There is historical precedent for this form
of stewardship in historical Scottish land holdings, in Roman law, and,
in a more contemporary sense, in the operation of property rights in relation to sacred Maori sites in New Zealand.92 The operation of these systems
gives us some insight into the forms which stewardship as akin to trusteeship (and the limitations of this analogy are considered below) can
take. It is here that we begin to see the true nature of stewardship finding
its place within more or less contemporary land owning structures.
Historical Scottish Clan Ownership
First, this second strand can be seen in Scottish clan structures
with the chief of the clan for the time being charged with improving the
land for the good of the clan for now and in the future.93 The concept of
dùthchas, or trusteeship, highlighted this duty on the part of the clans
89
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to maintain the stock of their property.94 This duty “had no force in law,
[but] nevertheless had the force of custom behind it”95 and, as Dodgshon
highlights, the boundary between law and custom at this point in Scottish history was difficult to draw.96 In terms of accountability, the clan
chief would be accountable to his clan members, and in practice a clan
chief who did not act in accordance with this principle would struggle to
maintain the allegiance of his extended family group.97
Certainly it is known that consenting to a clan’s eviction from the
land amounted to a breach of the duties associated with the dùthchas, and
alienation of the totality of the land, too, would constitute such a breach.98
The role of each individual tenant farmer was as maintainer and manager
of the land for the benefit of the clan as a whole, both for now and in the
future. The notion of stewardship underpinned Highland land holding
until the demise of the clan structures.99 In fact, Hunter argues that it
was the abandonment (an abandonment strengthened perhaps by the
advent of land registration) of this concept of landholding that prompted
the demise of the clan structure: “[a]ll concept of the kindred’s interest
in the land was consequently cast aside, while the encouragement thus
given to former chiefs to become landlords on the southern model virtually shattered the already weakening paternal affection which the traditional chief had felt for his clan.”100
Thus, to foreshadow the arguments presented below, we see that
the duties associated with decision-making in the land were integral to
the community structures built around that land.
Roman Law of Usufruct
A further aspect of stewardship is also arguably prevalent in the
Roman law of usufruct. Although the “steward” in this case was only
entitled to use the land and never came into ownership of it as such, the
extent of his rights can be compared to the rights and duties of the feudal
tenant.101 Whilst the usufructuary had the right to take the fruits of the
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thing,102 he had to maintain it and make no alterations to the object of
the usufruct.103 The standard of care in the usufruct was that of the bonus
paterfamilias.104 This standard, i.e., that expected of a good head of a family, ties in with the notion of the usufructuary as a quasi-steward: he was
expected to maintain the property with which he was entrusted to the
standard that a person maintaining his property for the benefit of his
family and its future and he was accountable to the bare owner if he
failed to do so.105
The importance of this example lies in the distinction to which we
return below106 between use of land, and ownership of rights in that land,
and the place which decision-making occupies on that spectrum. Whilst
rights of use and rights of ownership are often distinguished—indeed, it
is this distinction which forms part of the explanation for the rules of
nuisance within the contemporary takings jurisprudence107—in fact the
two are not a strict dichotomy, but exist on a broader spectrum referred
to as the decision-making spectrum.
Maori Sites
In 2017, the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement)
Act gave the Whanganui river in New Zealand’s North Island legal personality.108 Of course this is significant in itself, but it is notable for this
Article because of the form which that legal personality took. The Act
establishes a trust, and the trustees of the river are given rights not only
in relation to its management, but also duties to ensure its ongoing integrity.109 Rogers explains the legal structures which emerge:
The Act establishes the office of Te Pou Tupua. This will
carry out functions analogous to those of a trustee, with an
overriding duty to uphold the Te awa Tupua status, to promote and protect the health and wellbeing of Te awa Tupua,
to carry out landowner functions on land held by the Te awa
102
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Tupua . . . . A distinctive facet of the trusteeship role of the
Te Pou Tupua is their obligation to uphold the Tupua te
Kawa. This is a broad concept that encompasses both the
physical and spiritual aspects of the environment . . . . The
concept encompasses the Maori belief system that regards
people and their environment as one indivisible, mutually
interdependent, whole. Traditional Maori concepts of stewardship reflect a different relationship between kinship
groups and the land to that in most Western legal systems.
The relationship of people to the land and its resources,
and the associated customary concept of stewardship, are
reflected in the Maori understanding of kaitiakitanga. This
is a concept that has been developed through the need to articulate Maori spiritual and cultural concepts in the process
of settling claims in the Waitangi Tribunal claims process.110
The proprietary rights, which are conferred onto the trustees as
part of this process of establishing legal personality for the river, are, in
the sense explained here, intimately connected with the purpose for
which those rights were granted, with the interests and needs of others
(particularly the indigenous community), and with the land and environment itself. Thus, whilst the legal structures utilized are labeled as that
of the trust (becoming parasitic upon a familiar form of land holding in
the common law heritage), as we shall see below when we compare the
trust with a more robust stewardship duty, it becomes clear that the New
Zealand example is more one of stewardship that it is of a trust, notwithstanding its apparent legal form.111 The reason for this lies primarily in
the diffuse group of both present and future beneficiaries, and in the
recognition that action can be on the basis of the “needs” of the environment, an entity incapable of holding the rights of the beneficiary of a
trust (even if the environment can be said to have rights of a certain
form, they certainly are not the kinds of proprietary rights of which
interests under a trust are made up).
The Trust Analogy
As a general outline then, stewardship as a background principle
in legal regulation generally demands that the owner of property use and
manage that property for the benefit of something or someone else, but
110
111

Rodgers, supra note 92, at 270.
Id.

2019]

PROPERTY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

567

also allows the owner to do so. As Brown Weiss argues, “[e]ach generation is thus both a trustee for the planet with obligations to care for it
and a beneficiary with rights to use it.”112 The steward is the beneficiary
of rights and is burdened with obligations, a characterization which is
central to our later discussion. He is, above all, a decision-maker directed
to take into account certain considerations whether he is charged with
acting for the benefit of the future, or for the benefit of his principal, and
it is these features that appear in the examples of stewardship as a legal
concept discussed here.
Brown Weiss’s analogy to a trust is important and deserves
greater attention here since it is both instructive, and limited. Brown
Weiss suggests that we should regulate our relationship with the planet
through a “planetary trust” which is akin to a charitable trust of the sort
found in Anglo-American trust law.113 Although Brown Weiss argues that
the resulting concept is still a trust,114 it is suggested here that what she
describes is not a trust, but is stewardship, and that the differences she
highlights between “the planetary trust” and a charitable trust are the
differences between trusts and the notion of stewardship.115 First, she
highlights that trusts have a moment of creation: they are established as
a result of an act, be that deliberate or unknowingly.116 They do not just
exist as the obligation to act as a steward could be said to exist. Of
course, as Brown Weiss herself highlights, “while no affirmative action
need to be taken to create the planetary trust as a moral obligation, to
have legal force it must be effectuated by positive law.”117
This does not mean, however, that the stewardship is created by
an active step on the part of the steward, nor can it be so created. Rather
it is an obligation that is part and parcel of the ability to make decisions
about land.
Secondly, fiduciary duties as understood in Anglo-American trust
law have detailed rules relating to value and ensuring the financial
integrity of the trust.118 There is no such fiduciary duty associated with
stewardship.119 Instead, the provisions relate to a specific aspect of
maintenance of the property—i.e., ensuring the land is in a particular
112
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state—rather than ensuring that the property keeps its financial value.120
Furthermore, the trustee in a traditional trust is able to sell the relevant
property, transferring the trust interest into substitute property. This is
not the case with stewardship because the interest of future generations
in the land will remain regardless of any sale, etc. Thus not only are the
duties associated with stewardship different to those seen in a traditional
trust situation, but they also interact with the property in a different way.
A third and much more fundamental difference is the beneficiary
of the trust and the stewardship obligations. With a trust, even a charitable trust, the class of beneficiaries is limited.121 With the stewardship
obligation, this is not the case. The beneficiaries are all those in the land
community (a concept explored below), i.e., all those who rely on the land
for survival and to thrive (in the sense of human flourishing). That is, at
the very least, all humans are beneficiaries of the stewardship obligation
(animals may also be such beneficiaries, but the controversy over the
ability of animals to hold rights is enough to make one pause rather than
committing to animals being beneficiaries of this obligation122). Furthermore, the trustee of a trust will not always be a beneficiary of that trust,
and in the case of a charitable trust, he will not be, at least not “with his
trustee hat on.” By contrast, with stewardship, the steward is necessarily
also a beneficiary. The role of beneficiary and steward are inextricable.
There are therefore crucial differences between a trust and stewardship,
although the analogy is an instructive one.
B.

Nature and Content of Stewardship as a Legal Principle

From these historical and contemporary forms, and from unpacking the analogy to the concept of trusteeship, we can start to discern the
essential features of stewardship as a legal principle. In this Section, we
consider some aspects of stewardship in its legal form in more detail.
1.

Is a Steward Primarily a Duty-Bearer or a Rights-Holder?

This question gets to the heart of what role a legal system would
assign to a person acting as steward and to what extent he is made
accountable for breach of any duties associated with his stewardship role.
In order to determine this, it is necessary to understand more about the
120
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interaction between the steward’s property rights in the land and his
obligations that derive from his role as steward. Once this is understood,
it is possible to examine, first, the content of the obligation in more detail,
and then second, the rights required in order to be a steward.
Lucy and Mitchell argue that the steward is primarily a dutybearer.123 Although he holds rights, the raison d’être of the steward is to
ensure that the property is maintained for the benefit of future generations
(on their conception).124 The effect that this would have on our analysis
is that we would have to conclude that the steward’s primary role was as
“guardian” of his land. A distinction is drawn with the usufructuary for
whom the raison d’être of his rights in the land is to benefit himself—to
use the land and take the fruits—not to benefit future owners.125 As a
result, although he must maintain the land and ensure that the overall
resource level on the land is not diminished over the duration of his
rights, the essence of the usufructuary is that he is a rights-holder.126
Lucy and Mitchell argue that a steward, on the other hand, is only
given rights as a means to allow him to perform his duties as a steward.127
Whilst it is true that the steward is obliged, it is impossible to get away
from the fact that he must have rights in the land concerned, and, most
importantly, that we may only conclude that it is just to make him responsible for managing the land because he has rights to enjoy that land
(as we explain below).
We should not conclude, however, that as a result of being the
person entitled to use and manage the land, the role of the steward is
primarily as someone who holds rights over land. He is more than this
precisely because he is the steward. The dichotomy between rights-holder
and duty-bearer is circular: it is simply two sides of the same coin. The
rights that the steward has over land, to enjoy it himself, and to make use
of the land in such a way that manages it for the benefit of the present
and the future, are critical to his ability to be steward.128 It is for this
reason that the test for who is the steward below relies on having rights
over land.129 To be a steward one must have both duties and rights.130
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There is then another way of characterizing the essence of the
steward. The steward is the person most entitled to manage the land in
question: he is the decision-maker in relation to that land.131 Having the
decision-maker over the future of land burdened with obligations when
making their decisions is a hallmark of a system based on stewardship.
This is not often acknowledged in the literature, but it is argued here
that this role is what is most crucial about the steward. The steward’s
rights in relation to the land can be exercised by him, but must be exercised in such a way as to comply with his obligation to manage the land
for the benefit of future generations, as well as for his own benefit and
for the benefit of other members of the current generation.132
It is actually this aspect of stewardship which causes some from
an ecocentric perspective to reject stewardship since they argue that it
implies that man has dominion over nature if he is entitled to take decisions over its future. Palmer for example argues that stewardship symbolizes despotism, and this is precisely because the steward has such a
central role as decision-maker.133 Attfield rejects this argument, stating
that a steward, whilst being a decision-maker, is subordinate in many
ways to those whose interests he is charged with serving, in the manner
of a trustee and his beneficiary.134 It is this subordination that leads to the
answerability for the steward.135 This complex relationship of decisionmaker and beneficiary, and of answerability, is a more accurate representation of the role of the steward than one which focuses on dominion.
The role assigned to the steward as individual representative of
present and future generations is a complex and, at times, apparently a
contradictory one. He is not simply a servant of future generations; he is
also at times their mouthpiece in the decision—a decision for which he
will be answerable.136 He is the initial arbiter of what happens to the
land at the present time, but he is also the arbiter of what characterizes
the interests of the future generations. Is it possible to be both? It is submitted that it is possible to in this sense represent the future generations, because he is part of the intergenerational community discussed
here. If we take the idea that as a result of his role as a member of the
131

Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory, 20 VT.
L. REV. 299, 320–21 (1995).
132
Caldwell, supra note 3, at 766.
133
Clare Palmer, Stewardship: A Case Study in Environmental Ethics, in THE EARTH
BENEATH (Ian Ball et al., 1992), discussed in ATTFIELD, supra note 14, at 48.
134
ATTFIELD, supra note 14, at 194–95.
135
Id. at 49.
136
Id. at 47.

2019]

PROPERTY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

571

land community he is able to assess what might be in the interests of
future generations, it makes perfect sense for him to then make his decision on this basis. This decision will of course be potentially subject to
review and in this review the state may act as proxy to represent the
interests of future generations—but he is able to both decide their fate
and decide the interests of the future generations with which his stewardship obligation is concerned.
It is this central role in the fate of the land which is key to the
notion of the steward. In this sense the steward is neither primarily a
rights-holder nor a duty-bearer, but he is, by virtue of his rights and the
obligations attached to the exercise of those rights, a decision-maker.
Demsetz describes the position of private property where the owner of the
land acts as a broker taking into account competing claims of the present
and the future.137 He argues that: “future generations might desire to pay
present generations enough to change the present intensity of land usage.
But they have no living agent to place their claims on the market.”138
The steward, it is submitted, must act as this living agent and act
on the basis of uncertain or unknowable information. This fact should
color every aspect of a system of stewardship. The position of the steward
is summarized by Attfield: stewards can be curators, trustees, guardians
and wardens.139 Each of these persons is a decision-maker.
In the steward’s role as decision-maker, however, there is no doubt
that in order for stewardship to function as a legal principle the steward
must be accountable. This accountability can be explained in a number
of ways. The first explanation arises from the fact that the legal principle
is grounded in morality.140 It was argued above that the moral principle
entails sanction for breach.141 The legal principle would also contain such
a sanction. Unlike with the moral principle, however, the nature of legal
norms is such that the sanction would not be imposed by the steward
upon himself, or even by a deity, but by the community of which he forms
part, i.e., the state. This sanction would of course not always be applied,
but the possibility of such a sanction is central to the concept of stewardship as a legal principle.
It seems then that whilst the stewardship principle will affect
decision-making, it does not in itself always tell us what the correct
137
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decision will be. To use a hypothetical example from a situation of contaminated land, the steward may have to decide between a costly but
speedy clean up, and a cheaper but slower method. By employing either
of these methods he will manage the state of the land for the benefit of
future generations. This is exactly what he intends to do. Would a system
of stewardship dictate between these two options? Stewardship would
not tell us which option was better in and of itself. The justifications
behind stewardship might help, but this means considering more than
simply the obligation to make decisions to manage land in accordance
with the interests of the future. The reason for this is that simply stating
that we should act for the benefit of the future does not tell us to what
extent the needs of the present generation should be ignored where two
possible routes will lead to the same benefit for the future.
As a result it is possible to argue that stewardship is linked to a
more decentralized mode of decision-making.142 As Attfield highlights,
“depicting humanity as in a position of trust with respect to nature does
not involve understanding society or government as either undemocratic
or unrepresentative; if anything it commends democratic debate, so that
the members of society can jointly discover or decide how to exercise their
role.”143
The adoption of the attitude of stewardship as a legal principle
has benefits beyond the effects that it has in improving the state of land
for the future, or maintaining a healthy ecosystem, etc. Adopting stewardship as a legal principle could potentially change the method of decisionmaking within a local or national area.
2.

What Does the Stewardship Obligation Entail?

In making decisions about the future of land ,then, the steward
is burdened with obligations, and will be accountable for any breach of
these obligations, so the final part of the picture of stewardship is what
obligations bind this decision-making power. He has an obligation to
consider and take into account interests of future generations. We must
ask whether this obligation to take account of future generations prevents the steward from taking account of the interests of current generations. It is submitted that it does not.144 Caldwell in his assessment of the
meaning of stewardship includes an obligation to take into account the
142
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needs of present generations when making decisions about the land.145
However, the two needs may conflict. How should this conflict be resolved? This is especially relevant in relation to land use since the needs
of the present generation can clearly be detrimental to the future, without either use being irresponsible.
The answer to this question lies not in a dichotomy between the
present and the future, but rather in the types of current and future interests that should be taken into account. Stewardship as a legal principle does not allow all future interests to be sacrificed for the benefit of
the present, but it does not mean that the present interests cannot also
be served.146 Since the steward is decision-maker, he must be equipped with
criteria to determine whose interests prevail where the interests of the
present generation come into conflict with the potential interests of future
generations. It is suggested that the source of this solution lies in the moral
justifications for stewardship, in questions of intergenerational justice
and ecological ethics, and in the legal justification. These both aim at balance: balance between the needs of the generations, and balance within
the biosphere. The tools to assist the steward are to be found in these
considerations, and as such economic advantage in the short term to the
few should be discounted, but gradual rather than sudden improvement
can be encouraged within stewardship since this achieves the balance
that justice and ecological principles demand.
The interests of future generations can therefore be balanced with
the needs of the current generations, and given a lesser priority, where it
is possible to conclude that the need of the current generation is greater
and more pressing. The stewardship duty, as a result of its foundation in
ethics, is above all else about finding a balance between what is currently
needed and what will be needed in the future. It is not about excluding
one interest.
3.

Who Is the Steward?

As far as the identity of the steward is concerned, it is suggested
that it need not be the “absolute owner” of the property in the sense of an
unburdened freehold owner (see, e.g., the Whangangui river provisions).147
At the very least, it will be very rare that a freehold owner of a parcel of
land finds his land entirely unencumbered. This is not a barrier to the
145
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imposition of stewardship obligations. What this does mean, however, is
that the “owner” in this broader sense, i.e., someone with sufficient rights
to act as a steward generally, may not be able to take a particular decision that he believes is necessary to protect the interests of a future
generation. One example might be that he is not entitled to allow some
trees to grow since his land is burdened by a neighbor’s right to light. In
this case, the owner would not have the right to grow trees, and there is
no right to be burdened by his stewardship obligation. The owner cannot
decide to grow trees, and so there is no decision-making process into
which considerations of the interests of future generations can be fed.
Sound environmental policy may suggest that the rules regarding the
rights to light in this example be changed, but that stewardship duties
do not themselves achieve this.
This does not mean that no one is capable of being a steward,
however, simply because their ownership rights are restricted in other
ways. The person capable of being steward will simply be the person who
is best placed to make decisions about the future of the property, i.e., the
person who is capable of being steward.
Often it will not even be the person that we might commonly call
“the owner” of the land who is best placed to make the decisions over the
land. In relation to long leases, as is discussed below,148 if the freeholder
can make decisions he may fall under a stewardship obligation, but,
depending on the terms of the lease, he may not have any such power.
The long leaseholder however is unlikely to have freedom to do whatever
he wishes with the land. The incidents of ownership are divided. The position where there are multiple owners is discussed below.149 The steward
will, however, probably need to have a certain minimum threshold “quota”
of rights before we can truly conclude that he is the steward. These rights
would include, for example, the rights to decide the use to which the land
is put; whether buildings can be erected on the site; whether the site can
be used for excavation; if there is to be demolition of buildings; and the
right to make decisions about the bringing in of wastes or other toxic
materials onto the site that may cause harm to nature or lead to contamination on the site, amongst others.
Furthermore, Sheard argues that the content of a property right
bounded by the principles of stewardship will vary according to the type
of property we are dealing with since the manner and needs for management of it for the preservation of future generations will depend on what
148
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the actual thing is.150 As a result it is not possible to outline definitively
in advance what rights are needed, hence the circular nature of the test
employed. It is not argued that the test is necessarily helpful in practical
terms, but it is suggested that it does clarify what is crucial about the person whom we are to label steward. It is not the person who would be most
able to make the relevant decision as a result of his knowledge of ecological science, or the person with the most resources to put into managing
land; it is the person who is best placed to manage the land given the
rights that they have. It is for this reason that stewardship attaches to
the owner of rights in land.
Finally, we must ask what impact on this analysis is made by the
fact of rights of alienation. The owner of land can sell his land. Is this
right bound by the duty of stewardship, or does it fall without the scope
of the stewardship concept? It is suggested here that since it falls under
the decision-making powers in relation to the land, the landowner will
be bound to consider the needs of future generations and his obligation to
manage the land to that effect when deciding to alienate his land. He
could therefore be in breach of his stewardship obligations by transferring his land to another whom he knows will not act responsibly in relation
to their own management of the land. It may also be that the person to
whom the land is transferred does not comply with their stewardship
obligations without the original owner being in breach. All will depend
on the facts, but the existence of a right of alienation does not prevent
the owner of land from being considered its steward. He is simply able to
resign from this post. Stewardship then is intimately connected with
ownership and the rights associated with that ownership.
4.

Multiple Owners

What happens, however, where different persons are authorized
to make these decisions? There is an essential distinction in cases like this
between those who are in general entitled to make decisions by virtue of
their own rights in the land in question (such as the grant of a lease), and
those who have been authorized by another to make decisions but do not
have rights in the land. The latter category is the idea of the land agent in
the sense used in the 19th century.151 This person is not the steward in
the sense used here. The key to this lies in the fact that the authorization
150
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for such a person to make decisions springs from somewhere, and in most
cases, this will be from the freehold or long leasehold owner. The freeholder or leaseholder have chosen to delegate their decision-making, but
have not limited their own property rights in the process. As a result they
would remain a steward. The land agent is simply an extension of the
landowner himself. Where, however, the landowner grants out some of
their own property rights, as with the grant of a lease, they may surrender enough of their own decision-making powers so as to no longer be the
person most able to make those decisions necessary to be a steward.
It is in theory possible, however, that two or more people may be
the steward of the property. There are two situations where this might
happen. First, there may be joint tenants of a long lease, or holders of the
freehold as a joint tenancy.152 These people hold under the same title and
as a result have identical rights over the property.153 Where there was
more than one person with the same title, the stewardship would then
operate in the same manner as a trust since there can of course be more
than one trustee, but they hold rights in the property identical to all other
trustees.154 It is only at this point that factual possession will become
relevant since where there are multiple owners the person in possession
may in fact be best placed to decide the future of the property. This does
not affect the character of the steward, simply their knowledge and practical ability. This position in terms of the stewardship obligation is relatively straightforward. The parties are owners of a single, unified estate,
and are therefore jointly obliged to manage their land in such a way as
to advance the interests of future generations.
Secondly, there may also be two or more “owners” of the land, for
example under the relationship of landlord and tenant.155 In these cases
the individuals have different rights and decision-making powers.156 It
is argued here that although in some of these cases there will be more
than one steward (in the case of certain landlord and tenant relationships) this will not always be the case.
There are, of course, some situations where the rights of the tenant
under the particular lease arrangement will be such that it is not possible
to conclude that they have any stewardship obligations. In short residential
152
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leases, although the tenant will have an estate in the land, this estate
will not have been granted with the power to make any decisions over the
state of the land.157 In this case, although it would be possible to conclude
that there is a stewardship obligation in one sense, since the tenant is an
owner of an estate in land, the obligations would not “bite” as there would
be no rights to decision-making that would be limited by the stewardship
obligation. In longer leases, and in leases where more extensive decisionmaking powers are granted, the stewardship obligation will bind the
tenant to the extent of his estate. As a result, in a lease of ten years in relation to a commercial building, for example, the company tenant would
be obliged to manage their use of the building in such a way as to ensure
that they were acting for the benefit of future generations. The extent of
the obligation would relate to the extent of the rights.
There is a problem with this analysis in that leasehold estates
are, by their very nature, limited as to time, and the right over the land
is limited accordingly. The freehold interest is, by contrast, theoretically
indefinite. Does it matter that the rights of the leaseholder are limited
in time and that the leasehold estate can disappear? It is submitted here
that because stewardship can be justified by wide considerations of
justice not related to the relationship between successive land owners per
se as explained above, it does not depend on the idea of the chain of
ownership. The steward is not just managing his land for the benefit of
future owners but for the benefit of future generations in general.
Similarly, it could be argued that the very philosophy of the lease,
as ownership limited in time, is contrary to the idea that the estate
should be managed for the benefit of the future. It might be that whilst
the freeholder has responsibilities to the future, one of the great advantages of being a leaseholder can be to remove the responsibility to maintain the property. Instead, the property can be used as desired, within the
terms of the lease, with the freeholder left with any remaining responsibilities to ensure that the land is managed responsibly, etc. In short, it
could be argued that the lease arrangement is the entire extent of the
obligations that will fall on the leaseholder.
This cannot be true. A leaseholder, as occupier of the land, can fall
under numerous duties that are not outlined in the lease document, e.g.,
in relation to nuisance.158 The lease does not outline the total extent of
the duties that fall on a leaseholder.159 Thus, if the leaseholder has rights
157
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which allow him to make decisions over the future of a particular area of
land, then he will fall under stewardship obligations when making such
decisions. He may not have such rights, but if he does have such rights,
the fact that he is a leaseholder as opposed to a freehold owner should
make no difference to the conclusion that he falls under an obligation to
manage the land for the benefit of future generations.
This analysis can be demonstrated by an example. The provisions
of a lease stipulate that whilst the lessee is able to develop the property,
he must obtain the consent of the freeholder. How would the stewardship
obligations operate in this situation? It is suggested that the correct way
to analyze this is as the lessee having the primary decision-making right
but this right is limited by his obligations to manage the land for the
benefit of the future. So, he would only be able to propose a development
where that development met with his stewardship obligations. His rights
are limited both by the obligations contained in the lease and the obligations that are imposed on him by the principle of stewardship. The
freeholder does not have the right to build on the land but he does also
have an important decision-making right and he too must act in such a
way as to comply with his stewardship obligations.
C.

Justifications of the Legal Duty of Stewardship

We come now to the heart of the matter. The moral principle of
stewardship is susceptible to a wide variety of justifications, depending
upon one’s world view. So too, one may argue, is the legal principle depending on how one conceives of legitimate legal action. However, almost
all explanations for the normative power of legal obligations allow for the
law to step in to prevent harm to others. This Section explores whether
the legal principle of stewardship can be justified on the basis that the
obligations thus imposed prevent harm to others. Intuitively, we may say
that much environmental damage does indeed cause such harm, but the
problem with explaining stewardship on this basis is that the stewardship duty may “bite” where only the future owners or users of the relevant land would be affected, and, by definition, such persons do not exist
at the time. How does this interact with the principle of legislation on the
basis of preventing harm?
The justification advanced here is that the relevant harm is harm
to the “land community”—the collective of those who depend upon the
land for their human flourishing, for whom the land represents an investment in the form of capital, labor, emotion, etc. The steward’s decisionmaking is restricted and guided by the obligations that fall on him, and
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his rights facilitate it.160 He is the primary decision-maker in reference
to the land and becomes part of the land community161 as a result of these
obligations and duties because his future as a human actor depends, in
part, on the decisions which he makes in relation to that land. This means
that he becomes part of the community of landowners who as a whole are
obliged to act in furtherance of their stewardship obligations. By his membership in that community he also becomes a beneficiary of the ensuing
approach to the management of land. Attfield outlines how a stewardship
obligation “owed” for future generations must operate in practice and it
is clear that in his model the “proxies” (i.e., those who become the individual representatives of future generations—in our model, the owner of
the land and the steward) would become primary decision-makers answerable to “as representative a body as could be devised, granted the
nature of the interests in question.”162 Thus not only is the steward a
decision-maker, he is a decision-maker who will be accountable to the
state under a legal system that is based on stewardship as part of the land
community. His accountability is a hallmark of stewardship, and the
existence of the ensuing land community explains why the state ought
to be the body that carries out this task of calling stewards to account.
1.

Limitations on Rights and the Harm Principle

The starting point for this discussion is the harm principle. The
harm principle, as originally articulated by Mill, is the idea that the state
should not use legal means to restrict an individual’s liberty unless
acting in order to prevent harm.163 Under Mill’s formulation of the principle the relevant harm is harm to others.164 Some have argued that harm
to the actor himself can be included within the scope of the harm principle such that the principle can justify paternalism.165 The principle cannot,
however, justify legal moralism whereby the only justification advanced
for regulation is that it ensures that the subjects of the rule are acting in
accordance with morality.166 In this way, justifications for the translation
160
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of stewardship from an ethical principle into a legal one must go beyond
the justifications for the ethical principle and must instead explain why
the state is justified in enforcing the ensuing duties.
The harm principle, and its apparent focus on individualism and liberty (and the consequential problems with justifying state limits on liberty)
has been regularly the subject of criticism. However, recent defenses of the
harm principle have been made by Feinberg,167 and along very different
lines, by Raz.168 Feinberg’s formulation here is particularly useful:
It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation
that it would probably be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the
one prohibited from acting) and there is probably no other
means that it equally effective at no greater cost to other
values.169
It not only defines the harm principle, but also situates the harm
principle within a general framework of state action. That is, as we
explained above, the harm principle on this formulation is not necessarily the only form of justification which can be made for state action, but
rather that it is a particularly strong justification. Furthermore, Feinberg
makes clear that criminal sanctions (as present in many environmental
protection regimes) especially require this type of justification: “the harm
and offence principles . . . between them exhaust the class of good reasons for criminal prohibitions.”170
It is of course very difficult (if not impossible) to articulate a precise definition of harm that will always give a “bright line”171 between
justified and unjustified regulation. Indeed, such a bright line is not really
needed for the harm principle to act as a useful guide. Nonetheless,
Feinberg does attempt a definition of harm172 which has been rearticulated in a useful way by Warner:
[W]e can restate the harm principle as follows: it is always
a good reason in support of penal legislation that the
167
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legislation would probably be effective in preventing the
setbacks to interest—where: (1) there is no justification of
[sic] excuse for the setback; (2) the setback violates a right
of B’s (that is, there is a certain sort of justification for not
setting back another’s interest in that way); and (3) there
is probably no other means that is equally effective at no
greater cost to other values.173
The key to this approach to harm is in recognizing that harm
contains within it notions of justification and value.174 It ought not to be
considered an objective question. Furthermore, the notion of harm relies
on the idea of a setback to interests. A legal system would not be justified
in intervening to prevent the removal of options for an individual which
are neither of interest to him, nor valuable as morally worthy options.
The acceptance that the harm principle depends upon value judgments explains why the criticisms of the harm principle advanced by
Levine175 and Aagaard176 do not pose a problem to the usefulness of the
principle as a potential justification for the imposition of stewardship
duties. They argue that we cannot define harm because harm depends
on what people perceive to be harmful to their interests according to
their own personal perspective.177 However, this definition fails to grapple with what interests really means in this context, as we explain below.
Furthermore, we can use the subjectivity of the harm principle to our
advantage. If the notion is context-dependent, then it means we can finetune it to the particular context with which we are concerned—here, land
use and environmental degradation—thus allowing us to tailor the justification in the harm principle to the specific case at hand.
2.

Environmental Harms

To substantiate this further, it is essential to examine the nature
of environmental harm as we can begin to see here how the nature of
such harms justifies the imposition of stewardship duties against the
173
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background of the “land community” explained below. There is no denying that environmental harms are complex. They are (especially) collective, disparate, cumulative, and uncertain. When understood simply as
harm to the environment, Aagaard is perfectly correct that harm is useless
in assisting our understanding in what is and what is not justified legal
intervention.178 The challenge, as Lin discusses, is that the concept of
harm “has expanded beyond physical and economic injuries”179 and this is
certainly true. However, Lin seems to assume that we should make our
concept of harm cover what we want to regulate, rather than the other way
around.180 Lin concludes that “[e]nvironmental problems, however, often
cause harm that is latent, less direct, and less obvious.”181 Yet it could be
argued that environmental damage is not harm within the scope of the
harm principle at all. The crucial step to make, however, is to conclude
that although harm to the environment understood from the ecological
perspective is not harm under the harm principle (because it does not in
itself constitute a set back to an individual’s interests without more), the
effects of environmental problems on the community of land owners is a
recognizable form of harm that the harm principle can cover. In this
sense, it is the very collectivity of environmental harm which becomes the
linchpin for justifying restrictions on liberty on an individual in terms of
the ways in which they must make decisions in relation to their land.
The next step is to ascertain how, in tending to address the risk
of harm, rather than harm itself,182 risk-based regulation can be interpreted in line with the understanding of harm advanced here. Because
“[r]isk-based regulation . . . is premised on collective harms and operates
to prevent harm before it occurs,”183 it is suggested that we must draw
together this idea of collectivity and uncertain harm to the environment
and develop a coherent concept of harm that is sensitive to and reflective
of the specific nature of environmental problems.184 We do this by relying
not on the idea of harm to the environment, but harm to individuals. Lin’s
approach therefore is the starting point, but it is certainly not the end.
When one begins to unpack the concept of harm in this context,
a pattern begins to emerge. There is a difference between damage to the
178
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environment itself and harm to a person’s interests. One’s interests are
not simply one’s rights, but also one’s liberties. Not only does one have
these individual interests, but one also has a generalized interest in the
upholding of the system that gives effect to these rights, interests, liberties,
etc. So, it is against A’s interests for B’s property rights to be taken from
him without due process and for B to have no recourse in this situation because it weakens A’s faith in the system protecting his own rights. This
understanding, as will be seen, allows us to get to the bottom of the problem
of collectivity, but it also provides much-needed stable normative content
to the harm principle in the context of environmental degradation.
3.

The Land Community

The first step is to take the concept of harm beyond environmental harm and tie it instead to the interests of people. This is not to say
that morally we cannot aim to protect the environment for its own sake.
It is saying that when seeking to explain stewardship of land on the basis
of the harm principle, we ought to look to the interests of landowners and
users to help stabilize the definitions used. If this is accepted it does not
mean that we need to lessen the stringency of our environmental law,
rather that we must look at the meaning of harm in the context of individuals to determine what it is about environmental degradation that can
cause harm to individual interests when seeking to give content to the
stewardship obligations which inhere in the concept of property under
the conception outlined here.
In order to understand how this works in practice we must look
at the concept of the land community. This notion relies heavily on Honoré’s
explanation of group obligations.185 The land community, as defined here,
is the collective both of rights-holders in land and of those whose flourishing depends upon the land in the vicinity (in this sense, they have a
direct and identifiable interest in the land).186 The land community, as
a group, in order to maintain the group, has to ensure that the obligations and rights that make up the rules of that group are enforced. If
these rules are not enforced then the group will fall apart.187 Thus the
group is justified in obligating its members to keep the rules of that
group. This is concerned with the coordination rules of the group. For
example, the group is justified in using coercion to ensure that the land
185
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boundaries in place in that group are maintained because this is a prerequisite for membership of the group.
Thus, we can summarize the justification for the imposition of
stewardship through law as follows:
(a)

(b)
(c)

(d)

(e)

The community of landowners and users depends
on the mutual reinforcement of the integrity of rights
in land for its existence. The members of the group
have an interest in the maintenance of that group.
Thus, any action by a member of the community
that threatens the integrity of those rights is detrimental to the existence of the group.
The integrity of those rights depends not only on
the fact of ownership, but also on the quality of that
ownership and on the maintenance of land which
does not threaten the health and safety of those
who hold rights in that land. Similarly, land which
threatens neighboring landowners land is detrimental to the integrity of those rights.
Any action, then, which undermines the quality of
land, even if only to person A’s land, poses a setback
to B’s interests, not because of the environmental
harm done per se but because it makes it more likely
that C, D, E, and F may also undermine the quality
of their land such that B’s right in his own land is
under threat from the misuse of neighboring land.
It is therefore harmful for B through his justified
interest in being a member of a thriving community of landowners and users for A to mistreat A’s
own land where that mistreatment threatens the
overall integrity of the rights that B possesses. This
threat comes from the generalized threat posed to
the group and B has a continuing interest in the
flourishing of the group.

Taken together, these steps explain how the constraining of rights
in land can be justified on the basis of preventing harm. Before we move
on to consider what the consequences of this justification are for the shape
of the ensuing obligation and for stewardship in general, it is important
to consider two aspects of this justification: First, with its roots in liberalism (in its traditional sense), does this justification, in taking such an
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anthropocentric approach, undermine the ethical duties of the steward and
the wider environmental benefits? Second, is this justification exclusionary
in the sense that it explicitly cannot take account of the interests of those
who are unable to use or have rights in the relevant land? In this sense,
the justification outlined here could be said to be privileging those who
have rights in land, to the detriment of those who are already disadvantaged by their disenfranchisement from the land community.
Anthropocentrism and the Environment
The justification given here is explicitly, and indeed necessarily,
anthropocentric. The harm principle by its very nature demands anthropocentrism. The result of this is that even in imposing duties to maintain
the natural environment, this justification still puts the interests of
human beings at the core of the duty, thus making the environmental
protection susceptible to limitation in the face of supervening or superior
interests of persons. Anthropocentric-focused protection of the environment thus risks being no protection of the environment all.
On one level, this criticism is entirely correct. However, to explain
why this does not undermine the project undertaken here, at no point is
the claim made here that this is the only possible justification for legally
imposed stewardship duties. Rather, it is a particularly strong justification, and, in Feinberg’s words, an almost irrefutable justification.188 From
a deep green or ecocentric perspective, therefore, it is possible to make
a justification for stewardship which does not depend upon identifying
a harm to human interests, but the justification presented here cannot
be denied on the basis of the prevention of harm, meaning that for those
who advance liberty in relation to property in the face of environmental
degradation, this explanation and justification of stewardship acts as a
counter-argument to those who would argue that limitation on property
rights in the way explained here cannot be justified.
Exclusionary Effect
The second criticism is that in taking a traditionally liberal perspective, this justification inherently prioritizes the interests of those
who already have an existing stake in the land in question thanks to the
their social and legal status in other respects. For the displaced, this
188
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justification gives them nothing, and in this sense, the imposition of stewardship duties justified on the basis of the maintenance of “the land-owning
class” is itself propping up the private property system which has caused
so much trouble in the first place. Indeed, this criticism has been made
forcefully in respect of some articulations of both stewardship and sustainability more generally, so that the principles ensure protection of the
privileged in the present and the future, leaving the poor and dispossessed
to remain victims of infringements of environmental justice.189
Again, this is a justified criticism. However, we ought to acknowledge that the justification given here allows for the imposition of stewardship duties even with the contours of private property remaining in
place. Without seeking to explore this in detail, it could even be said that
the imposition of stewardship duties as explained here could be introduced under the takings clause without engaging constitutional protections
precisely because these limitations are articulated as existing in order to
prevent harm to the land owning and using community, and in this sense
perform a similar role to the rules of nuisance.
D.

Consequences

The final issue to be considered is the consequences of the justification outlined above for the nature and content of the stewardship obligation. We consider two here—the fact that the justification above means
that in a sense, stewardship inheres in property; and that the legal
principle justified on the basis of harm entails accountability in law.
1.

Stewardship Inhering in Property

Sheard highlights that “[s]uch stewardship rights are restricted
property rights offering rights of use over land and its fruits but no right
to damage it or to modify its nature in ways that put the basic interests
of others, both current and future, at risk.”190
The other way of phrasing this is to say that stewardship obligations restrict property rights. Is such a notion inconsistent with our understanding of private property, or is it necessary to it as suggested above?
Indeed, is the concept of private property so “endemically problematic”191
that it should be abandoned altogether, with stewardship seen not as
189
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obligations “bolted onto” the private property paradigm, but rather as a
radical alternative to it?192
Stewardship property is often contrasted with private property
and there is a long-running dispute as to whether private property as a
notion is compatible with duties of stewardship. The essential point that
advocates of this argument make is that once an owner of land is restricted in the content of his rights to the extent that stewardship obligations demand, he can no longer truly be considered as owner of the land.193
It is not simply that his ownership has been curtailed, but that it is
meaningless to say that he is owner at all. Only an outline of this debate
will be given here for the purposes of highlighting certain aspects of stewardship. It is argued that there is no necessary conflict between ownership in private and a system that subjects private owners to certain duties
based on the legal and ethical principle of stewardship. Furthermore,
when we examine those claims that private property and stewardship
should be seen as alternative paradigms, very often this conflict is highlighted because stewardship would be “better” from an ecological or justice
perspective—it suits a certain policy goal.194 But private property is what
we have, and any movement from that position to encompass a generalized duty of stewardship would need justification beyond its simply
achieving certain ends.
A starting point is in Waldron’s definition of private property: “in
a system of private property, the rules governing access to and control of
material resources are organized around the idea that resources are on
the whole separate objects each assigned and therefore belonging to some
particular individual.”195
A similar definition is used by Demsetz: “private ownership implies that the community recognizes the right of the owner to exclude
others from exercising the owner’s private rights.”196
Using this definition Lucy and Mitchell have argued that “the existence of a duty of stewardship cannot be compatible with a claim to
have private property in land.”197
This argument does not stand up to scrutiny, however. Duties of
stewardship do not alter the organization of access to and control of land.
192
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The power to make decisions of access and control still lies with the
owner of the land. The difference that the stewardship duties make is
that the steward can be called to account for these decisions and that
certain factors must be taken into account when making such decisions.
The decisions can be reviewed as to whether they comply with his obligation to maintain the property for the benefit of the future. His decisionmaking power remains; it is simply that this decision-making power is
constrained by the fact that private property is a network, and that network can demand certain action in order to maintain the existence of the
network, even if it means that one individual’s liberty in relation to their
land is not optimized.
For the same reason, Gray’s argument—that where there is
legislation which imposes restriction in the interests of public protection,
the property has thereby become quasi-public and can no longer be considered as private property198—cannot be sustained in relation to restrictions which arise from the very nature of the land community. He argues
that in such cases “[t]he state itself becomes a vital factor in the ‘property’ equation: all ‘property’ has a public law character. Private ‘property’
is never truly private.”199 Certainly there is some scope within Waldron’s
text for concluding that stewardship property is not private property
when he states: “[the owner’s] decision is to be upheld by society as
final”200 in a system of private property. Arguably the steward does not
have the final decision since his decision-making can be subject to review.
There is no difference between this and normal property rules,
however, and it is suggested that Waldron here is not excluding the possibility of review of decision-making, which, as we have highlighted, is
an essential part of a system of stewardship. He is simply highlighting
that the decision of the landowner is not to be taken as simply part of the
equation of determining what is to happen to his land. There is a difference between the possibility of reviewing a decision and treating that
decision as only one stage in a multi-stage process. It is only the latter
which is incompatible with Waldron’s definition.
The power to review decisions in the courts at the suit of an organ
of the state does not mean that the property is not held as private property
and so this possibility in a regime based on stewardship does not mean that
the property is not held in private. The question is not whether the decision is subject to review, but whether the owner of the land has a right
198
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to decide at all. In cases of stewardship the very essence of the principle
is that he has a right to decide and a duty to decide in a certain fashion.
It is clear, then, as Karp highlights, that “[s]tewardship can be
imposed on private property ownership whilst preserving the important
characteristics of private ownership, such as shared expectations, stability, fairness and liberty,”201 and it has been argued here, with decisionmaking power vesting with the owner. It is crucial to recognize that the
notion of stewardship relates to rights and duties—the content of the
“bundle of rights”202 that makes up ownership. It tells us nothing about
whether or not private ownership should be permitted. Stewardship property would not fall under Waldron’s category of “collective property”203
since use and access to the property will not be determined by society as
a whole for the benefit of society as a whole, but rather by an individual for
a specified set of future interests.204 As a result, stewardship systems are
compatible with the idea of private property; they just restrict private
property rights and oblige the owner of the land to behave in a certain way.
The point which those who contrast private and stewardship property are getting at can, however, be useful. They are attempting to highlight the differences between owning in a system of stewardship, and
owning within a system where the right to use and abuse the land and
to exploit it for the owner’s own benefit forms part of the “bundle of rights”
making up, in Honoré’s terminology, the incidents of ownership.205 It is
perhaps no surprise against this background that there is no general
principle that a landowner cannot use his rights in land in order to abuse
his land. Frazier labels this theory, which sees the starting point for ownership as “absolute ownership,” the “classical liberal property theory.”206
Although absolute rights of ownership have never existed in the
sense that one person has all the incidents of ownership outlined by
Honoré and unlimited liberty to do what he wants with an on his land,
this idea does form the foundational philosophy of much worldwide regulation of ownership, especially in the USA207 and UK.208 Nonetheless,
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Caldwell is correct to state that “[t]he right to hold, enjoy, develop, and
protect land, as well as to profit from its use, was never absolute.”209 Lucy
and Mitchell agree with this assessment: “[the] undeniable truth about
existing Western societies [is] that our rights of exclusion, control and
alienation in relation to land are severely constrained.”210 This admission
seems to detract from their argument that stewardship is incompatible
with private property. Private property does not demand absolute rights.
Caldwell accurately describes the attitude which is characteristic of
systems of private property: “as owner of land he owed no obligation to
neighbor or posterity, and very little to the state.”211 The attitude that an
owner of land has no obligations to his neighbors of the future would be
incompatible with stewardship, but there is no reason to adopt this attitude even if one does subscribe to a system of private property.
As a result of this attitude, however, regulation which could be
said to reflect stewardship will struggle to be accommodated within a
system whose structures evolved on the back of such a philosophy.212 A
system of stewardship can then be contrasted with prevailing systems of
private property in so far as the content of the rights, and more particularly the attitudes associated with ownership, will be different. This has
led some to comment that “environmental rules of this kind are arguably
a new species of property rule in that they impose positive obligations as
an attribute of the exercise of ownership privileges.”213 This seems to
overstate the position. Environmental rules do not necessarily impose a
new species of ownership. Ownership is still private. They simply impose
a new attitude that must accompany this ownership. The change is one
in philosophy, not in the structure of ownership.
This change in philosophy does not mean that the notion of
private property must be abandoned in favor of ownership on the basis
of duties of stewardship. In fact, if individuals are to act as stewards it
is necessary to retain a concept of private ownership. The relationship
between stewardship and ownership of land is therefore not only a close
one but also a critical one. In order to act as steward in the sense outlined here, the individual must have rights in the land in question in
order to be able to make those decisions that are so central to his role.
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Accountability

Our starting point is that the steward becomes a member of the
land community through his ability to make decisions over the future of
land; that is, he is obliged by the rules of that community and benefits from
others’ compliance with those rules. This community is a legal community. Membership of this community is part and parcel of becoming a
steward. In Honoré’s language, the notion of stewardship is the “shared
understanding” which defines the group, but this group can only exist as
long as “the prescriptions to which the understandings related [are]
broadly . . . effective.”214 In other words, the group understanding that
landowners will comply with the requirements of stewardship will only
define the group as long as the obligations are enforced. The land community can only exist as long as the obligations of stewardship are effective,
and since the land community forms a necessary part of the notion of stewardship, the disintegration of the group would mark the end of the legal
principle of stewardship. The two notions are mutually reinforcing. As a
result, the stewardship obligation must be, at least to some extent, upheld
by the group—“there must be a substantial measure of compliance.”215
In addition to the existence of the group, however, as Honoré
makes clear, the group relationship is necessary to the existence of the
legal obligation per se.216 This goes beyond the continuation of the land
community, and into the continued existence of the law following the disintegration of the community: “all law is the law of a group of individuals
or of groups made up of individuals. No one can make a law purely for
himself . . . . The existence of a group is therefore a necessary and arguably a sufficient condition of the existence of laws or something like
them.”217 Therefore, not only is the continued enforcement of the rule
holding the group together necessary for the continued existence of the
group, i.e., the land community, and the mutuality of benefit and burden
associated with that group, it is also necessary for the continued bindingness of the rules associated with the group—in this case, the obligations
of stewardship.
Thus, accountability can be seen to form a part of the notion of
stewardship as a legal principle, and although the steward is accountable
to other members of the land community, this accountability is enforced
by the state as proxy. The consequences of being called to account for
214
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failure to comply with the duties of steward should be a sanction strong
enough to ensure compliance, as Honoré outlines,218 but also a sanction
which goes some way to redressing the wrong committed. This can be
seen when once again we look at the analogy with a trust. The duty of a
trustee is to personally account for what his beneficiary is due and he
does this by either providing substitute performance or by paying money
from his own account. As a result, not only must the steward be accountable for any failure to comply with his obligations but this accountability
must also lead to consequences designed to achieve the same end result
as if he had complied with his duties in the first place. This type of accountability is therefore an essential element of a stewardship regime.
CONCLUSIONS
If we combine the threads of this discussion, then the following
becomes apparent. First, stewardship is a conclusion—it is an obligated
mode of behavior which requires that persons with control and responsibility in relation to land act in a certain way. They will be accountable for
any breach of those obligations. Second, to justify that conclusion, we must
examine the source of the penalty for breach. If the penalty is to be found
in the “court of public opinion” or in the perpetrator’s conscience, then
the moral obligation can be justified by reference to both anthropocentric
and ecocentric considerations, from secular and religious perspectives.
If the penalty is imposed by the legal system—through an institutionalized
form of state power—then an additional justification is needed. This must
explain why it is legitimate to impose an obligation onto a person. Such
justifications in the literature are typically composed either of references
to obligations emerging in respect of countervailing rights, or by reference to limitation of harm to others. Relying on this sort of justification
for stewardship duties is rendered problematic by the fact that it is
challenging to identify any countervailing rights (when the stewardship
duty is, in effect, one with an eye on future generations—in whom would
such rights vest) or any harm where harm is understood as a setback to
the identifiable interests of others. Whilst polluting acts which extend
beyond the borders of an individual’s land can easily be justified on the
basis of harm to neighbors, it is much more challenging to justify an
obligation to one’s own land in a good condition.
Of course, many if not all legal systems around the world will demand that landowners do fall under obligations in respect of certain
218
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substances—hazardous waste in particular is heavily controlled so that
landowners cannot simply dispose of such substances onto their land
without a licensing system in place—but such is a specific obligation justified by the risk of harm to existing individuals.219 A stewardship obligation goes beyond this. It not only introduces an obligation to not damage
property, thus risking such harms, but to maintain, and even improve.
It is in the obligation to maintain and improve—the very essence of
stewardship, and the reason why it is called upon to form part of our
understanding of private property—which appears on its face impossible
to reconcile with either the rights-based or the harm-based justification
for obligation.
This fear is considered by Lin. He argues that “environmental law
has developed as a series of responses to demonstrations of harm”220 and
highlights that “if harm is present or anticipated, the harm principle
provides a well-established justification for a legal response.”221 He continues, “[i]f harm is absent, one implication might be that the situation
in question is beyond the proper reach of the law.”222 However, the justification, as explained here, arises from the fact that property rights in
land do not exist in isolation. Indeed, their value and potency is explained
only by the fact of their being part of a network. Inherent within membership of this network is the maintenance of the network. In this view,
as explained, stewardship is justified not by reference to harm to others,
but by reference to harm to the group, of which a property owner is by
necessity a committed member (for, without the group, there would be no
property). This justification operates so as to explain why stewardship
obligations can (must) inhere in private property, but it also has consequences not only for the who will be the steward, but for the precise content of the legal obligations that will rest on their shoulders as a result.
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